Bank Restructuring, Competition, and Lending Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Banking Sector by Giannoccolo, Pierpaolo & Mansilla-Fernández, José Manuel
 ISSN 2282-6483 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank Restructuring, Competition, 
and Lending Supply: Evidence from 
the Spanish Banking Sector 
 
Pierpaolo Giannoccolo 
José Manuel Mansilla-Fernández 
 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N°1113 
 
 
 
 
Bank Restructuring, Competition, and Lending Supply:
Evidence from the Spanish Banking Sector ∗
Pierpaolo Giannoccolo† Jose´ Manuel Mansilla-Ferna´ndez‡
This draft:
November 6, 2017
Abstract
This article analyses the effects of the bank restructuring process performed in Spain
between 2010 and 2016. First, we create a unique dataset by combining information from
Bankscope and the Table of Public Financial Assistance released by the Bank of Spain.
Second, we investigate whether these reforms affected (i) the stability, (ii) the degree of
competition, and (iii) lending and liquidity supply of the Spanish banking industry. The
main results suggest that the restructuring process reduced the degree of competition but
increased financial stability in the Spanish banking industry.
In particular, we find that two divergent forces affected the Spanish financial stabil-
ity. On the one hand, the bail out dampened financial instability. On the other hand,
the increasing bank market power fostered financial stability (i.e., lower risk-taking be-
haviour). Furthermore, we demonstrate that the restructuring process: (i) increased the
Lerner index, (ii) did not increase the collusion among banks (iii) diminished the gap
in cost efficiency between weak and healthy banks. Finally, we find that there are not
improvements in lending and liquidity supply.
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has particularly affected the Spanish banking sector, which has
experienced accumulated losses of EUR 104,569 million between 2011 and 2012. Several studyes
show that not the whole banking industry was equally affected when the crisis became systemic.
Although commercial banks and credit unions did not require public support, the crisis was
mainly focused on the most part of the savings banks. Notice that, in Spain these saving banks
(Cajas de ahorros) are foundations principally controlled de facto by regional governments
and received, during the reform process, public financial support subject to a restructuring
process of the industry (see Tahoun and van Lent, 2010; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Faccio
et al., 2006). More precisely, the troubled savings banks were encouraged to be integrated
with the healthy ones in form of institutional protection schemes or merged with other healthy
financial institutions by the Spanish authorities. Consequently, the number of savings banks
were reduced from 45 in 2009 to 10 resultant financial institutions (of which 8 are banks and
2 remain as savings banks) in 2016 (BdE, 2017). The bail-outs were implemented in two
phases. Firstly, two savings banks were nationalized: Caja Castilla-La Mancha in March 2009,
and Cajasur in May 2010, both with public support. Later on, other 33 savings banks were
involved in the process with public financial support amounting to EUR 9.7 billion. Likewise,
the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB for its acronym in
Spanish) injected capital amounting to EUR 5.7 billion into four banking groups subscribing
common shares. The overall capital needs have been significantly reduced owing to burden
sharing measures, divestments, and the transfer of problematic assets to the asset management
company (‘Sociedad de Gestio´n de Activos procedentes de la Reestructuracio´n Bancaria’ -
SAREB for its acronym in Spanish).
The main purpose of this article is to assess whether these institutional reforms improved
the stability of the Spanish banking industry, their impact on credit and liquidity supply for
the real sector and how the intensity of competition evolves in this specific industry. From one
side, we argue that this Spanish reform is worthy of research in order to test some theoretical
predictions given by the literature. In particular, several scholars have outlined that govern-
ment interventions during systemic banking crises may exacerbate problems of moral hazard
because banks may anticipate bail-outs and begin risky businesses (Hakenes and Schnabel,
2010). From the other side, we believe that this is an interesting case study to test the how the
competitiveness changes in the banking industry after these kind of reforms. Importantly, since
the bailed out institutions were selectively encouraged to be integrated, the Spanish reform is
a good opportunity to investigate whether the consolidation process has effectively reduced the
degree of competition in the Spanish banking industry, i.e. higher monopoly power. To the
best of our knowledge, this study is one of the first attempts to assess the repercussions of
finance assistance programmes, i.e. bail-outs, on financial stability and banks’ lending supply
and liquidity creation, following changes in market structure raised by regulatory interventions
as two differentiated transmission mechanisms.
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This research combines bank information from Bureau van Dijk Bankscope and the Table
of Public Financial Assistance released by the Bank of Spain. Accurately, our research question
is: what has been the trade-off between competitiveness and financial stability?
Regarding the competitiveness, we identify two opposite forces which affect the competit-
iveness of the Spanish bank industry after the reform. First, we find that the Lerner index has
raised again after implementing the restructuring process. This result is normally associated
to lower competition in the market. Second, we find that the gap in cost efficiency between
troubled financial institutions (weak banks) and healthy banks was diminished as well respect
the pre- reform period. This result is normally associated to higher competition in the market.
This question is worthy of research since monopoly power has found to increase margins, capital
ratios, charter values (Coccorese, 2009), interest rates (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010), and
reduce lending availability according to the market power view (e.g. Elsas, 2005; Degryse and
Ongena, 2008; Carbo´ et al., 2009).
As for the financial stability, in line with previous research (e.g. Martinez-Miera and Repullo,
2010; Liu et al., 2013), the results of this study predict that capital injections were not enough to
restore financial stability of the overall Spanish banking industry. This result might be driven
by the effects of the extension of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone and the upsurge
of the crisis between 2011 and 2013 which affected specially to the real sector. In spite of
providing a second capital injection –FROB II– and regulatory changes between 2011 and 2012
aimed to intensify the recovery of weak banks, these efforts were not enough to restore financial
stability (see BdE, 2017, page 245). Nevertheless, we also find that the reduction in the degree
of competition helped banks to increase their ratios of profitability and capitalization.
Furthermore, we find that the volume of risky assets has been reduced after the reform.
It is so possible conclude that the Spanish banking market is becoming less heterogeneous
due to the selective elimination of weak banks, i.e. less banks but healthier. Notice that
this result it is strictly related to the lower gap in cost efficiency between weak and healthy
banks. Moreover, our analysis demonstrates that credit and liquidity supply lessened after the
restructuring process even though after controlling for demand factors. This result is in line
to the credit conditions surveys conducted by the Bank of Spain. These surveys show that the
Spanish financial institutions reported a drop in the demand for credit until the end of 2016,
contrary to the Eurozone banks, due to the deleveraging process carried out by the private
sector.
Finally, our results are consistent with recent research on regulatory interventions and bank
performance (e.g. Berger et al., 2016; Buston, 2015; Korte, 2015).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 discusses the precedents of the Spanish banking sector and the restructuring process
analysed in this study. Section 4 presents the methodology. Section 5 describes the main
results. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Literature review
The recent global crisis, one of the most severe since the Great Depression, has been character-
ized by the large number of failed financial institutions (Acharya et al., 2014). The crisis has
shown the importance of having strong mechanisms to allow for the resolution of failed banks
(Laeven and Valencia, 2013). The resolution of a financial institution is defined as the restruc-
turing process of the bank in order to recover the continuity of its essential operations, preserve
financial stability, and restore the viability of that institution (Gordon and Ringe, 2015). Before
the sovereign debt crisis, ‘bail-out’ approach has been the most frequent regulatory intervention
at the bank level used by the governments to restore financial stability (Acharya et al., 2014).1
The standard argument is that systemic regulatory policies lead to collective moral hazard
problems. This problem arises when banks have access to cheap funding, incentivising them to
increase their borrowing and reduce their liquidity. Thus, interventions may have repercussions
over the whole financial sector since some banks may play safely, whilst others may start to
assume risk (Farhi and Tirole, 2012).
The debate about the repercussions of government interventions in banking markets is still
alive. Government interventions have been found to exacerbate problems of moral hazard as
banks may anticipate bailouts and reduce market discipline (see Bianchi, 2016; Dam and Ko-
etter, 2012; Flannery, 1998; Hryckiewicz, 2014). During systemic crises, bail-outs contribute
to relaxing balance sheet constraints and reducing the severity of the recession. The effects
of government interventions on moral hazard can be minimized if bail-outs are systemic and
broad-based; but economy may become more vulnerable if interventions are idiosyncratic or
targeted (Bianchi, 2016). Dam and Koetter (2012) study moral hazard problems related to
bailouts in additional risk taking due to higher bailout non-observable expectations. Political
factors may explain bailout probability, but not risk-taking behaviour. They find for a sample
of German banks that moral hazard effect is not driven by government-owned or regional sav-
ings banks, the so-called Landesbanken. In addition, other authors demonstrate that politically
connected institutions are more likely to receive public support (see Tahoun and van Lent,
2010; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Faccio et al., 2006). Tahoun and van Lent (2010) show that
congressional equity ownership in the private sector affects the extent and the length of gov-
ernment support committed to any firm during the bailout of the financial sector. In addition,
Duchin and Sosyura (2012) demonstrate that investment in politically connected firms under-
performs unconnected recipients according to both stock-based and accounting performance
based measures. Duchin and Sosyura show that a firm whose director served at the Treasury
or one of the banking regulators were 9.1 percent more likely to obtain government funding;
firms headquartered in the election district of the House members on the key committee were
6.3 percent more likely to be approved. Faccio et al. (2006) show that those politically con-
1The Directive 2014/59/EU – Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive – introduces the ‘bail-in’ principle
as the resolution mechanism in the EU countries, in substitution of the ‘bail-out’ principle. The main difference
between both resolution mechanisms is that the ‘bail-in’ put the costs of resolution on creditors of the stressed
banks instead of taxpayers.
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nected firms exhibit worst financial performance than their unconnected peers at the time of
and during the bailout. This evidence demonstrates that political connections may influence
allocation of capital through the mechanism of public assistance when firms take on periods of
economic distress.2 Closely related to this article, Illueca et al. (2014) demonstrate that the
rapid expansion of the Spanish saving banks –cajas de ahorros– into regions was partly due to
the connection between the board of directors and the same political party as the same region
of the bank, and for firms in the real estate and building sectors. As a result, the geographic
expansion of the savings banks was associated with ex ante risk-taking behaviour and –ex post
default risk. Similarly, Mart´ın-Oliver et al. (2017) demonstrate that the restructuring of in-
solvent savings banks through intra-regional mergers did not work on this occasion. Political
interests at regional levels continued to reduce the resilience in responding to negative shocks.
Several authors advocate that regulatory interventions and capital support may alleviate
the consequences of a banking crisis. Theoretical papers predict that regulatory interventions
may be a determinant of bank’s portfolio risk, since bank’s risk-taking behaviour may involve
reductions in risky loans or liquidity creation (Mailath and Mester, 1994). Dell’Ariccia and
Ratnovski (2013) theoretical model is subject to two sources of risk. The first is idiosyncratic,
i.e. dependent on the quality of bank’s borrowers, which the bank can control through costly
monitoring or screening. The second is the risk of contagion, i.e. exogenous to an individual
bank, which has negative effects on the overall real economy, probably triggering a recession.
As a result, the ‘too-many-to-fail’ guarantee may generate strategic complementarity in order
to increase bank’s likelihood of being bailed out. To prevent this, the regulator should fol-
low a policy of non-rescuing ‘systemic’ banks in distress, but this policy would not be credible
(Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007, 2008a,b). Bailed-out banks may be perceived as riskier institu-
tions, the so-called stigma channel. Consequently, customers may reduce demand for credit, or
become financially constrained; in addition, they may also reduce supply of deposits or charge
higher interest rates since these banks are less likely to repay (Berger et al., 2016). Similarly,
Helwege et al. (2017) show that most institutions avoided using the Fed’s discount window
programme, i.e. to be bailed-out, in order not to be considered as an insolvent institution.
Empirical literature on banks’ ability to create liquidity, i.e. lending, after regulatory in-
terventions is rapidly growing (Berger et al., 2016; Buston, 2015). Berger et al. (2016) find
that regulatory interventions reduce liquidity creation, whilst capital support does not affect
liquidity creation. Importantly, they find that capital support contributes to reducing lending
as well as bank risk-taking behaviour, whilst regulatory interventions has no effect on lend-
ing. Similarly, Buston (2015) show that, although an increase in credit supply may increase
banks’ risk-taking, it may not be considered detrimental to financial stability if the regulator
focuses on proper risk management practices.3 Hryckiewicz (2014) analyses several bail-out
2Sapienza (2004) demonstrates that lending behaviour of state-owned banks, in terms of volume of credit
and interest rates charged, is affected by the electoral results of the party affiliated to the bank.
3Financial innovation enables banks to isolate financing and investment conditions from shocks. Furthermore,
financial innovations may allocate risk in the financial system more efficiently owing to risk may swift to more
stable financial institutions (see Froot et al., 1993; Norden et al., 2014).
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interventions to find that nationalization and asset management companies contributes to risk
the increasing. However, she also do find that under an appropiate combination of policies,
government may mitigate the effects on banks’ risk.4 Accomodating policies, particularly those
not well-executed, may dampen credit supply and economic recovery, increase the cost of credit
and the risk of moral harzard in the long term (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003). Diamond and
Rajan (2002) shows that bail-out decisions which may generate excess demand for liquidity
can create problems of solvency in the banking system, where contagion is spread through the
common pool of liquidity.
So far, the common background in the financial literature is that distorted incentives may
alter credit allocation and damage real economy performance. This raises the question that
which resolution policies may be more effective in recovering the status quo of the financial sec-
tor and the real economy (see Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Paravasini, 2008). Diamond and Rajan
(2000) demonstrate the importance of designing an adequate program of recapitalization since
too small capital injections may encourage perverse lending policies and reduce credit supply
for borrowers with valuable investment possibilities. Recently, Laeven and Valencia (2013)
demonstrate that bank recapitalization measures may foster credit supply, thus reducing finan-
cial frictions in particular for the more dependent non-financial firms.5 The real consequences
of banks’ bail-outs are weaker if bank recapitalization is underestimated, the consequences
for the real economy might be undesirable in terms of credit allocation, firm investment, and
employment (Giannetti and Simonov, 2013; Guizani and Watanabe, 2016). These results are
corroborated by Korte (2015) who demonstrates that a relatively stronger implementation of
bank resolution rules increases credit supply by benefiting high quality firm (quality channel),
and reallocating credit to firm which need to borrow more (quantity channel). The bank lend-
ing channel becomes crucial in the transmission of a shock liquidity to the real sector since
high-exposure banks tightened credit than low-exposure banks to non-financial firms (Cingano
et al., 2016). Closely related to our research, (Bassett et al., 2017) suggest that U.S. banks
which received extraordinary support from five government programs, did not augment credit
supply compared to banks that did not. The last findings suggest that lower credit availability
has negative consequences for a range of outcomes such as firm value added, investment and
employment (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Bentolila et al., 2017). For the case of Spain, Bentolila
et al. (2017) shows the existence of a supply credit shock in the Spanish economy after the
beginning of the banking crisis. Using data from the Central Credit Register of the Bank of
Spain between 2006 and 2010, Bentolila et al. estimate that around 24% of the job losses in
Spain were given in non-financial firms attached to banks which needed to be recapitalized and
restructured by the Bank of Spain and the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking
Sector (FROB for its acronym in Spanish). This paper extends this literature by evaluating
4See Honohan (2016) for similar results.
5Several authors analysed the effects of 1998 and 1999 capital injection on the Japanese banking system
obtaining diverse results. Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) do find that both policies were partially successful in
recapitalizing the banks. Montgomery and Shimizutani (2009) and Allen et al. (2011) find that after the 1999
recapitalization programme lending to SMEs was increased, but not under the 1998 programme.
Bank Restructuring, Competition, and Lending Supply 7
whether the process of banks’ resolution in Spain has increased financial stability.
Previous theoretical literature on Industrial Organization applied to the banking industry
predicts the existence of a trade-off between competition and financial stability which may en-
courage policymakers to favour concentration in case of financial crises (Allen and Gale, 2004).
On the one hand, the competition-fragility-view advocates that reduction in competition and
market power reduce interest margins and the franchise value, leading to an increase in risk-
taking activities (see IJtsma et al., 2017; Schliephake, 2016). Banks enjoying greater monopoly
power are able to look for better lending opportunities and increase margins, capital rations
and charter values make them better (see Coccorese, 2004, 2008, 2009). On the other hand,
the competition-stability-view predict that banks exhibiting greater monopoly power are able
to charge ‘uncompetitive’ interest rates to their customers, increasing the likelihood of loan
defaults, and consequently the risk of portfolios, making the overall banking system less stable
(Boyd and De Nicolo`, 2005). Empirical literature demonstrate the existence of U-shape relation-
ship between bank concentration and financial stability (e.g. Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010;
Liu et al., 2013). As far as we are aware, the foremost literature is growing towards the analysis
of the effects banking regulation and resolution mechanisms on the competition-stability nexus
(see Cummins et al., 2017; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010; Fu et al., 2014; Schliephake, 2016). In
this regard, the Hakenes and Schnabel (2010) theoretical model predicts that bail-outs lead to
higher risk-taking amongst the protected bank’s competitors. The basic idea is that subsidiza-
tion induces the ‘protected’ bank to expand its activities. As a result, the higher competition on
the deposit markets will lead to a reduction in bank margins, thus increasing bank-risk taking.
Fu et al. (2014) find for a sample of Asian-Pacific banks that bank concentration may foster fin-
ancial fragility, supporting the neutral view of the competition-stability relationship. Likewise,
some banks in the region are able to attain greater discretion in price-setting to increase profits
through channels different from market concentration, e.g. product differentiation. Cummins
et al. (2017) show that competition increases soundness and contributes to enhancing stability
of the EU life insurance industry owing to an increase in efficiency of the overall industry.
3 Institutional background
The study of Spain as laboratory is worthy of research. Like other European countries, the
Spanish resolution authorities have simultaneously recapitalized troubled banks, set up an asset
management companies (e.g. Germany and Ireland), and promoted asset protection schemes
-or IPS- (e.g. the UK). The distinction of the Spanish reform is that the bailed-out banks
-mostly savings banks- have been selectively encouraged to be integrated amongst themselves
or with other healthy banks (see Appendix A), and finally converted into commercial banks.
Consequently, the restructuring process has significantly reduced the number of banks, raising
market concentration of the banking industry in Spain. This section delves into the main
features of the Spanish banking sector before and after the bank restructuring process. The
first subsection deals with the conditions which promoted the rapid growth of credit, whilst
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the second subsection explains the main institutional reforms adopted to address the banking
crisis.
3.1 The Spanish banking sector before the crisis
As of the beginning of the restructuring process in Spain, the banking sector was composed of
three pillars: commercial banks, savings banks, and credit unions which differs in terms of own-
ership amongst them. Firstly, commercial banks are completely owned by their shareholders,
composed by nationwide or foreign banks, which operate through the whole domestic territory.
Secondly, savings banks were foundations controlled de facto by regional governments, and
the Catholic Church in two cases. Consequently, savings banks were less exposed to market
discipline than commercial banks, since they were not allowed to issue capital –or to be listed
in stock markets–, thus being less able to raise capital (see Bentolila et al., 2017). 6 7 Fi-
nally, credit unions, which are regulated by the Law 13/1989, are aimed at serving the financial
need of their shareholders, but also to other customers, are composed by credit cooperatives
and professional banks. Unlike the formal differences amongst the three pillars, the Spanish
regulatory framework is common for the whole financial institutions.
After the deregulation process in 1985, savings banks expanded considerably their business
insofar as the Spanish economy and external financial needs were growing. Similarly, savings
banks were gaining market share until equalizing market concentration with commercial banks
at the national level, or even they become more relevant in some provinces owing to their links
with the territory (Illueca et al., 2014; Mart´ın-Oliver et al., 2017).8
The Spanish banking sector were not strongly affected by the impact of the US subprime
crisis, but the structural problems of the Spanish economy began to damage the overall industry.
Table 1 shows that Construction and Real estate concentrated the most percentage of risk
exposure as of 2006. Later on, both sectors also presented the highest growth of non-performing
loans from the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007, reaching the absolute maximum in
2013. The data reveal that credit has been re-allocated to Industry and Services, considered
safer industry sectors. Moreover, within Services, Real Estate has been gradually losing weight
in favour of other sub-sectors such as Financial Intermediation or Other services. Financial
stability was gradually damaged insofar as the real sector were affected in form of financial
constraints, thus (i) reducing production of goods and services, (ii) increasing the unemployment
6Savings banks were found to be helpful to avoid social exclusion and financial constrains due to the simplicity
of their business and their close link to the territory.
7The legal framework of the savings banks was established through the Law 31/1985 of 2nd of August, along
with the regulation established by the regional governments after assuming their specific competences according
to the Spanish Constitution of 1978. This Law was repealed by the Law 26/2013 of 27th of December, on
savings banks and bank foundations.
8Mart´ın-Oliver et al. (2017) show that shortly after the creation of the Euro in which official interest rates
were low and abundant liquidity worldwide, banks and cajas migrated to business models more dependent on
market debt, despite having different ownership structure. After the crisis in the Euro area, cajas imitated
banks in their commercial patters, a usual practice after the above-mentioned liberalization.
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rate, and consequently (iii) feeding the volume of non-performing loans (see Figure 1).9
Figure 1: Non-performing loans (NPL) ratio and unemployment rate (2002-2016)
Source: Own elaboration based on the Bank of Spain database. The non-performing loans
(NPL) ratio is measured as loans to other resident sectors over doubtful loans. The unemploy-
ment rate is measured as the percentage of unemployed people actively seeking employment
and willing to work over the total labour force. The ratios are reported as a percentage.
This scenario of the overall banking sector affected savings banks more intensively than
commercial banks or credit unions10, which led to the decline and the transformation of the
most part of the savings banks into commercial banks, and triggered the beginning of their
resolution process (Funcas, 2015).
3.2 The implementation of the restructuring process
The assistance provided by the Spanish authorities during the bank restructuring process can
be grouped in five categories: (i) financial assistance disbursed for the recapitalization of banks,
(ii) contributions by the Credit Institutions Deposit Guarantee Fund (hereafter FGDEC, for
its acronym in Spanish), (iii) guarantees and institutional protection schemes (hereafter IPS),
(iv) extraordinary credit lines granted to financial institutions, and (v) contribution to the
SAREB, i.e. the asset management company, through the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring
(hereafter FROB, for its acronym in Spanish).
Since May 2009, the public financial assistance committed in several forms of capital in-
jections amounted to EUR 61,495 million, of which EUR 53,553 million has been provided by
9Recent studies demonstrate the labour disruptions created by the financial crisis, in particular in those
countries with a well-developed financial system, the so-called labour channel. Financial constraints are found
to be a catalyst (inhibitor) of job destruction because of firms experience a temporary decline in the demand for
their goods, and they will be unable to maintain their employees. In other words, financial constraints amplify
fluctuations over employment through the business cycle, particularly for the case of younger firms (see Braun
and Larrain, 2005; Pagano and Pica, 2012; McLean and Zhao, 2014; Boustanifar, 2014).
10Credit unions usually operate under a low-risk retail banking model.
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the FROB and EUR 7,942 million by the banking industry through the FGDEC. At the time
of writing this paper, EUR 2,686 million has been recouped, with the stakes of Banco Mare
Nostrum and BFA-Bankia still belonging to the FROB, along with the convertible bonds of
Banco CEISS and Banco Grupo Caja 3 for a total of EUR 991 million. Secondly, the FROB
granted several guarantees to the purchaser to facilitate the sale of the troubled institutions,
mainly IPSs. Guarantees totalling EUR 110,895 million have been provided by the State to
financial institutions, out of EUR 109,836 million have been cancelled at the time of writing
this article. No loss from these guarantees are expected to be assumed by the State (BdE,
2017).
The FGDEC, which was completely funded by the banking industry, provided EUR 7,942
million as assistance to the financial institutions in forms of capital, in addition to the EUR 2,250
million provided in 2009. The FGDEC acquired shares of savings banks, which are unlisted
financial institutions, controlled by the FROB which had been obtained from retail investors
in the hybrid instrument conversion process for a value of EUR 1,803 million the shares have
been sold for a value of EUR 673 million. Other guarantees granted by the FGDEC amount
to EUR 390 million. Finally, the FROB has contributed EUR 2,192 million to SAREB (BdE,
2016).
Finally, several consolidation operations were implemented between 2010 and 2016 in forms
of IPS, mergers, and integrations with other worthy banks (see Appendix 6). In this process,
forty-three out of forty-five savings banks were forced to be converted into commercial banks
as a part of the Memorandum of Understanding between Spain and the European Financial
Stability Facility which provided financial assistance for the recapitalization of the banking
sector (see Bentolila et al., 2017).11
4 Hypotheses, data and methodology
4.1 Hypotheses
The scope of this article is to analyse the effectiveness of the bank restructuring process imple-
mented in Spain between 2010 and 2016 as a consequence of the financial crisis. Based on the
theoretical foundations presented above, we formulate the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 (Financial stability) The bank restructuring process improved financial sta-
bility.
Hypothesis 2 (Liquidity creation) The bank restructuring process increased liquidity cre-
ation.
Hypothesis 3 (Lending availability) The bank restructuring process increased lending avail-
ability.
11Caixa Ontinyent and Colonya Caixa Pollenc¸a were not forced to be converted into commercial banks,
remaining as the two only savings banks in Spain so far.
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4.2 Data and sample selection
Bank balance sheet information is provided by Bureau van Dijk Bankscope and Orbis Bank
Focus databases. The dataset consists in quarterly information for a sample of Spanish deposit-
taking institutions for the 2002Q1-2016Q4 period. The sample includes consolidated balance
sheets and income statements of commercial banks, savings banks, and credit unions. Several
studies on the Spanish banking sector excludes information on credit unions because of these
institutions suppose less than the 10% of total banking assets and their main goal is usually
to provide financial services to their associates (Carbo´ et al., 2007). However, we include them
since these institutions started to gain importance in strategic fields such as financial exclusion
(e.g. Carbo´ et al., 2007; Prior et al., 2016), and savings banks have reduced their weight in the
final sample after the restructuring process.
We consider that the years selected to perform this analysis are relevant since we are includ-
ing the years previous to the financial crisis in which banks were granting the highest volume of
lending (2002Q1-2007Q2), the period between the beginning of the crisis and the restructuring
process (2007Q3-2010Q4), and the years in which the policy implementation was expected to
take effect (2011Q1-2016Q4).
Data are expressed in thousands of euros and are inflation adjusted. We also removed non-
consistent values such as zero total assets and zero employees. Finally, we obtain a sample of
3,350 observations for all sample years.
Information of the bank restructuring process is obtained from the Table of Public Financial
Assistance released by the Bank of Spain.12 The Bank of Spain regularly publishes backnotes
on public financial assistance in the restructuring process of the Spanish banking sector. The
note also lists the financial institutions which received any financial assistance and the amount
of the bail-out received. We use this information to break our sample down between the treated
group, or weak banks, if the bank received public financial assistance (Wi = 1), and the control
group (Wi = 0), otherwise. The subscripts i and t refers to banks and periods, respectively. We
list the banks classified as weak banks in the first column of Appendix A.1. Table 2 contains
the definition and the explanation of the whole variables employed in this article. We winsorize
the variables at 1%.
4.3 Measuring financial stability: The Z-score
We measure financial stability as the logarithm of the Z-score, which has been extensively used
by several authors (e.g. Laeven and Levine, 2009; Schaeck et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2013; Cummins
et al., 2017). Using accounting information on bank profitability, its volatility and leverage,
the Z-score is defined as follows:13
12Retrieved on the 27th of December 2016 from http://www.frob.es/es/Documents/presbe2016_41en.pdf
13Several authors test the robustness of the Z-score by including market-based risk indicators such as the
distance-to-default model (e.g. Fu et al., 2014), and the expected default frequency as a forward-looking indicator
(e.g. Gulamhussen et al., 2014). Note the reader that savings banks were not entitled to issue capital or to be
listed in stock markets, then we only can include accounting-based measures instead of market-based indicators.
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Zit =
ROAit + CARit
σ(ROAit)
(1)
where ROAit represents the return on assets computed as profits (or losses) before taxes over
total assets (TAit), CARit is capital over total assets, and σ(ROAit) represents the standard
deviation of total assets. We use a three-year rolling window for σ(ROAit) to allow for vari-
ability in the denominator and to avoid the Z-score depending exclusively on the variation of
profitability and capital cushion.
The Z-score measures the inverse probability of bank’s insolvency. A bank becomes insolvent
when its asset value is lower than its debt. The Z-score is interpreted as the number of standard
deviations that bank’s profitability has to fall below its expected value to absorb equity and to
make the bank default.
4.4 Measuring bank market power: The Lerner index
We use the Lerner index as indicator of banking competition. The Lerner index measures the
mark-up between the price and the marginal costs as a percentage of price, being therefore an
indicator of the extent of market power. The degree of competition ranges Lernerit ∈ (0, 1);
being Lernerit = 1 in case of perfect monopoly, Lernerit = 0 in case of perfect competition,
and exceptionally Lernerit < 0 implies pricing below the marginal costs, thus indicating non-
optimal bank behaviour. The Lerner index is calculated as follows:
Lernerit =
Pit −MCit
Pit
(2)
where Pit is the ratio of interest income plus other operating income over total assets; and MCit
represents the marginal costs of total assets (see Appendix A.2).
4.5 Empirical approach
This section discusses the identification strategy to estimate the impact of the restructuring
process of the Spanish banking industry, and the effects of the resultant bank market structure
on financial stability, lending availability, and liquidity creation.
Our empirical strategy will be based on the following standard difference-in-differences es-
timator:
yit = α0 + α1Wi + α2dt + α3Wi × dt
+ α4Lernerit−1 + α5Wi × Lernerit−1
+X
′
it−1Φ + vi + uit
(3)
where the variable yit is the dependent variable of interest correspondig to the following indic-
ators. Firstly, we employ the logarithm of the Z-score (ln(Zi)) as computed in expression (1).
14
14We use the logarithm operator to control for non-linear effects and outliers (see Liu et al., 2013; Cummins
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Secondly, we test for the robustness of the results obtained from the logarithm of the Z-score
by including the non-performing loans ratio (NPLit) defined as the volume of non-performing
loans to total loans to customers, and the density ratio compued as as risk-weighted assets over
total assets (RWAit/TAit) to checks the robustness of the results. The higher the density ratio,
the higher the risks that the bank is taking. Secondly, we use the variable LOANTAit to test
the effects of the policy implementation on lending availability. Finally, we introduce the ratio
liquidity creation over total assets (LCit/TAit). We calculate the bank’s i liquidity creation
(LCit) in thousands of euros following a slight variation of Berger and Bouwman (2009) and
Berger et al. (2016) three-step methodology. The components of LCit are listed in Appendix
A.3:
LCit = 0.5× illiquid assets + 0.5× liquid liabilities
− 0.5× liquid assets− 0.5× illiquid liabilities
− 0.5× equity
(4)
As for the explanatory variables, the variable Wi is a one-period-lagged variable dummy
which takes the value one if the bank is included in the treatment group, and zero otherwise.
The variable dt is a dummy variable which takes the value one after the policy was administered
to all the financial institutions listed in Appendix A.1 (t ≥ 2011Q1), and zero otherwise.
The variable Lernerit−1 represents the Lerner index computed as shown in expression (2).
The matrix X
′
it−1 is a set of control variables which includes the following one-period-lagged
variables. The income structure ratio (INCit−1) is computed as non-interest income over total
assets and controls for business diversification. The efficiency ratio (EFFit−1) is computed as
operating cost over gross income. We also include the dummy variable MAit−1 which takes the
value one if the banks has been involved in a process of M&A, and zero otherwise. In addition,
we control for demand factors by including the natural logarithm of the sale prices of dwellings
(Ln(Ht)).
Since we are also interested in analyzing the effects of bank market power as a result of
the restructuring process, we include the interaction term Wi × Lernerit−1 and Wi ×MAit−1.
Furthermore, we also add interactions between Wi and X
′
it−1 to control for the effects of the
policy implementation on each control variable. Besides, the variable crisist is a crisis dummy
which takes the value one if t > 2007Q3 onwards, and zero otherwise, to control for structural
breaks. Finally, vi and uit correspond to bank fixed effects and the regression error term,
respectively. We run the OLS estimator with bank fixed effects.
As for the interpretation of expression (3), the parameter of interest are α3 which measures
the effect of the restructuring process on the dependent variables, and α5 which shows the effect
of bank market power as a result of the policy implementation testing the hypotheses of this
research. The parameter α1 control for differences in control and treatment groups, α2 shows
et al., 2017).
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the effects on the dependent variable if the reform would not have been implemented. Finally,
the parameter α4 benchmarks the results of this research with previous studies which related
the effects of bank market structure on financial stability (e.g. IJtsma et al., 2017; Schliephake,
2016) and lending supply (e.g. Berger et al., 2016; Buston, 2015).
4.6 Theoretical approach
We consider a simple quantity competition model a` la Cournot. Let us assume a homogeneous
product market with n banks in which bank i sets q(i). Total output is Q = q(1) + q(2) +
. . . + q(n). The market price is given by the linear inverse demand p(q) = a − bq, with
a, b > 0. Let us also suppose that the cost functions are linear and given as C(i) = c(i)q(i),
with c(i) ∈ [0, a) ∀i = 1 . . . n. Solving the model for the quantity that bank i produces at the
Cournot equilibrium, we obtain:
q(i)∗ =
a− (n+ 1)c(i) +∑i 6=j c(i)
b(n+ 1)
(5)
the net effect is generated by the number of banks that remain in the market after the reform,
and their cost function.
Evaluated at the equilibrium, the effect on the profit performace of each bank is given by
the final quantity and the final price:
pi(i)∗ = b (q(i)∗) =
(
a− (n+ 1)c(i) +∑i 6=j c(i))2
b(n+ 1)2
(6)
equilibrium profits (pi(i)∗) decrease with c(i) and increase with
∑
i 6=j c(i), which means that
lower heterogeneity in the costs function matters. Thus, profits increase when the bank i
becomes relatively more efficient than its rivals.
Figure 2 represents the stylised facts of the reform in 2006, 2010, and 2016:
i) Spanish banks became more homogeneous in marginal costs; Figure 2-(a) shows that banks
became more cost-efficient after implementing the reform in 2010 (i.e., healthy and weak
banks reduced their gap in marginal costs).
ii) Spanish banks became more homogeneous in terms of degree of competition; Figure 2-
(b) shows that the gap between healthy and weak banks diminished after the policy
implementation.
iii) All Spanish banks are involved in the consolidation process; Figure 2-(c) shows that
healthy banks also carried out their consolidation process without the need to receive
public financial assistance.15
15The restructuring process of weak banks is detailed in Appendix A.1.
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Figure 2: Marginal costs, Lerner index, and number of healthy and weak banks (2002, 2007,
2010, 2016)
Source: Own elaboration based on Bankscope, and the Spanish Banking Association (AEB),
the Spanish Savings Banks Association (CECA) and the National Union of Credit Cooperatives
(UNACC) databases. Subfigure (a) displays marginal costs computed as shown in explained
in Appendix A.2. Subfigure (b) represents the Lerner index calculated as shown in expression
(2). Subfigure (c) shows the evolution of the number of Spanish banks retrieved from AEB,
CECA and UNACC databases.
These stylised facts may be interpreted in the light of the expressions (5) and (6). By using
this simple and standard Cournot model, it emerges clearly that the net effect of the Spanish
reform in 2010 is generated by two contrasting elements: i) the number of banks (healthy and
weak) decreases. Thus, the lower is n, the higher is the concentration in the Spanish banking
market (i.e., q(i)∗ and pi(i)∗ increase). ii) the gap in marginal costs between Spanish banks is
lower. Thus,
∑
i 6=j c(i)− (n+ 1)c(i) decreases (i.e., q(i)∗ and pi(i)∗ decreases).
To sum up, the net degree of competition raised in the Spanish banking industry after the
reform, but this net effect is lower than expected due to the two contrasting elements.
5 Results
5.1 Summary statistics and parametric and non-parametric tests
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the variables employed in this article. In Panel A we
observe that banks’ profitability (ROAit) has a mean value of 0.3 percent ranging from -4.7
percent to 1.6 percent, while the mean value of bank’s capitalization (CARit) has a mean value
of 6.7 percent ranging from 2.3 percent to 15.1 percent. Regarding financial stability measures,
the logarithm of the Z-score (Ln(Zit)) shows a mean value of 1.39 ranging from -2.30 to 3.65,
the non-performing loans ratio (NPLit) displays a mean value of 5.2, and the density ratio
(RWAit/TAit) shows a mean of 0.601. Regarding lending supply variables, the ratio loans to
total assets (LOANTAit) displays a mean value of 0.65 ranging from 0.01 to 0.925, while the
ratio liquidity creation to total assets (LCit/TAit) shows a mean value of 0.31 ranging from
-0.21 to 0.90. The Lerner index (Lernerit) is the variable of interest, showing a mean value
of 0.204 ranging from 0.003 to 0.575. As for the control variables, the income structure ratio
(INCit) shows a mean value of 0.33 ranging from 0.02 to 0.74, while the efficiency ratio (EFFit)
shows a mean value of 0.60 ranging from -1.60 to 2.8. Finally, the logarithm of the sale prices
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of dwellings (Ln(Ht)) shows a mean value of 7.40 ranging from 6.96 to 7.65.
We perform a mean-difference test, as shown in Panel B. In the first step, we create the
dummy variable Crisist, which takes the value one from 2007Q3 onwards in order to divide the
sample in two sub-periods: before (2002Q1 - 2007Q2) and after (2007Q3 - 2016Q4) the crisis.
We show that the parametric test rejects the null (H0 : Crisist(0) − Crisist(1) = 0) for the
whole variables except for LOANTAit. The results further show that the alternative hypothesis
is confirmed for ROAit and CARit (H0 : Crisist(0)−Crisist(1) > 0), thus indicating that banks
were better performed before the crisis as expected. Accordingly, the alternative hypothesis
is also confirmed for the financial stability measure (Ln(Zit)), as well as the non-performing
loans ratio (NPLit) which shows its growing path as a consequence of the crisis. Importantly,
the test also confirms the alternative hypothesis for the density ratio (RWAit/TAit) indicating
that banks have reduced their level or risky assets after the crisis. The other variable of
interest is the Lerner index (Lernerit) which is found to be higher after the financial crisis
(H0 : Crisist(0) − Crisist(1) < 0), as well as bank size (Ln(TAit)) which is shown that after
the crisis the volume of bank assets was higher.
To complement the results presented above, we perform a parametric test for comparison
of means for weak banks (Wi = 1) and healthy banks (Wi = 0) for the whole period (2002Q1 -
2016Q4), before the crisis (2002Q1 - 2007Q2), the quarterlies of the crisis before implementing
completely the restructuring process (2007Q3 - 2010Q4), and after the restructuring process
(2011Q1 - 2016Q4), as shown in Table 4. We show that the parametric test rejects the null
hypothesis (H0 : Wi(0) −Wi(1) = 0) for bank profitability (ROAit) for the period before the
crisis. However, this difference in profitability between the two groups disappear after the crisis
and, ROA continues decreasing on average even after the implementation of the restructuring
process, which means that the banking industry became more homogenous. Regarding bank
capitalization (CARit) the null is rejected before the crisis being healthy banks more capitalized
on average than weak banks. The difference in capitalization is more pronounced between both
groups after the crisis. Furthermore, weak banks display lower levels of stability (Ln(Zit)) and
the test rejects the null after the crisis and the implementation of the restructuring process.
In line with these results, weak banks display higher levels of non-performing loans (NPLit)
than healthy banks, and the test rejects the null after the crisis and the policy implementation.
Accordingly, weak banks also show higher levels of density ratio (RWAit/TAit) than healthy
banks and the test rejects the null for the three subperiods, i.e. before and after the crisis.
Regarding lending supply variables, weak banks show higher levels of LOANTAit than healthy
banks and the test rejects the null for the three subperiods. This result is consistent with
Bentolila et al. (2017) who show that the Spanish bailed out banks granted higher volume
of credit before the financial crisis. Additionally, these results are also consistent with other
authors whom demonstrate the importance of the bank lending channel as an inhibitor of
lending provision for high-exposure banks (Cingano et al., 2016). On the other hand, healthy
banks display higher levels of liquidity creation (LCit/TAit) on average than weak banks, and
the test rejects the null for the subperiods before the crisis (2002Q1 - 2007Q2) and after the
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restructuring process (2011Q1 - 2016Q4) at the 10% level. As for bank market power (Lernerit),
the results show that bank market power is higher before (2002Q1 - 2007Q2) than after the
crisis (2007Q3 - onwards). However, note the reader than Lernerit starts growing after the
restructuring process for both groups of banks. Importantly, the parametric test rejects the
null hypothesis in favour of the healthy banks which seems to have more capacity to reduce
marginal costs.
Table 5 reports the means values of the key variables divided in four quartiles of the Lerner
index. The first statistical test reveals that bank profitability (ROAit) ranges from 0.004 in
the first quartile to 0.008 in the fourth quartile, while variability in profitability (σ(ROAit))
also decreases insofar as bank market power increases. Furthermore, the capitalization ratio
(CARit) ranges from 0.057 in the first quartile to 0.069 in the fourth quartile. As a result,
the indicator of financial stability (Ln(Zit)) is also increasing in Lernerit ranging from 1.128 in
the first quartile to 1.496 in the fourth quartile. Accordingly, the non-performing loans ratio
(NPLit) is decreasing in Lernerit ranging from 0.071 in the first quartile to 0.045 in the fourth
quartile, whilst the density ratio (RWAit/TAit) ranges from 0.614 in the first quartile to 0.563
in the fourth quartile. This observation suggest that financial stability variables improve as
bank market power increases. Additionally, LOANTAit ranges from 0.690 in the first quartile
to 0.619 in the fourth quartile suggesting that credit supply decreases as bank market power
increases. On the other hand, the liquidity ratio (LCit/TAit) ranges from 0.211 in the first
quartile to 0.376 in the fourth quartile suggesting that liquidity creation decreases insofar as
bank market power increases. Finally, the F overall test rejects the null that the dependent
variables are independent of the four quartiles of the Lerner index (H0 : βn−quartile = 0) which
support the hypothesis that financial stability improves, lending supply increases and liquidity
creation decreases insofar as bank market power strengths, measured as the Lerner index.
Finally, Table 6 shows the results of the translog cost function described in Appendix A.2.
5.2 The effects of the bail-out on financial stability
The estimations of expression (3) are shown in Table 7. Using the OLS with bank fixed effects
estimator, we test whether the intervention of the Spanish national authorities improved the
stability of the overall banking system (H-1). The estimation of the parameter α3 indicates
that one-standard-deviation increase in policy implementation (Wi×dt) reduces Ln(Zit) by 0.04
percent. We find similar results for the non-performing loans ratio: a one-standard-deviation
increase in Wi×dt augments the NPLit by 0.01 percent in consonance with the results obtained
in the previous section. Importantly, we obtain negative and significant sign for α2 indicating
that in the absence of the bank restructuring process financial stability would have been reduced
in 0.08 standard deviations. The estimates for the coefficient α1 demonstrates the existence
of ex ante differences between weak and healthy banks before the policy implementation. We
also observe that a one-standard-deviation increase in LOANTAit−1 increases Ln(Zit) by 0.12
percent, remaining qualitatively similar after including interaction terms. Accordingly, the res-
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ults show that one-standard-deviation increase in LOANTAit−1, reduces the non-performing
loan ratio by 0.03 percent. The interaction term LOANTAit−1 × Wi is significant in both
cases, suggesting that the restructuring process has favoured improvements in financial stabil-
ity throughout a reactivation of bank credit to customers. Importantly, the results also reveal
that a one-standard-deviation increase in the Lerner index (Lernerit−1) increases Ln(Zit) by
0.02 percent, and similarly the non-performing loans ratio is reduced in 0.01 standard devi-
ations. In addition, we are also interested in analysing the effects of changes in bank market
structure due to the restructuring of the banking industry. We find positive and significant
sign for the interaction term Lernerit−1 ×Wi meaning that the subsequent reduction in the
degree of competition as a consequence of the restructuring process increased ex post financial
stability. In other words, the reform has reduced the number of financial institutions after
eliminating the least efficient ones, thus increasing financial stability. This result is in line with
previous authors whom demonstrate that bank competition may increase financial stability as
a consequence of capital regulation or resolution mechanisms (e.g. Berger et al., 2016; Hakenes
and Schnabel, 2010; IJtsma et al., 2017; Giannetti and Simonov, 2013; Guizani and Watanabe,
2016; Schliephake, 2016).
As for the components of the Z-score (Zit), the results shown in Table 8 also confirm that
the resulting reduction in the degree of competition increases banks’ capitalization (CARit)
and profitability (ROAit), being the impact in α4 and α5 higher for the first variable than for
the second one. Another important result is that the restructuring process reduces variability
in profitability (σ(ROAi)) even more than the reduction in ROAi. We indeed demonstrate the
robustness of the previous results: we identify gains in efficiency as the transmission channel
through which the reform has improved financial stability of the Spanish banking industry.
The results are also robust after taking into consideration the density ratio (RWAit/TAit) as
the dependent variable (Table 10). We observe that a one-standard-deviation increase after the
policy implementation (α3) reduced the density ratio in 0.045 percent. This result means that
government interventions reduced the level of risky assets in banks’ balance sheet or, in other
words, it augmented the levels of financial stability in the overall Spanish banking industry. The
results remain qualitatively similar for Lernerit−1 and the interaction term Lernerit−1 ×Wi,
demonstrating the robustness of the results presented above.
5.3 The effects of the bail-out on liquidity creation and lending avail-
ability
It might be argued that the restructuring process implemented in Spain has modified the
organization of the banking industry, and then credit supply and liquidity creation, also called
maturity transformation. We test whether the bank restructuring process has affected liquidity
creation (H-2) and lending availability (H-3). We report the results in Table 9. The estimation
of the parameter α3 indicates that one-standard-deviation increase in Wi× dt reduces liquidity
creation (LCit/TAit) by 0.035 percent after implementing the restructuring process. Column
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(2) shows that one-standard-deviation increase in Lernerit−1 increases liquidity creation by
0.01 percent. The results are consistent even after including in Columns (2) and (3) financial
stability (Ln(Zit−1)) and the non-performing loans ratio (NPLit−1) as regressors following
previous empirical research (e.g. Berger et al., 2016). We observe that the entire set of control
variables display the expected sign.
The estimates indicate that the restructuring process has not fostered lending availability
(Columns (4), (5) and (6)). We conclude that, at least in the short term, an increase in bank
market power reduces lending availability (LOANTAit) by 2 pp. We also suspected that the
re-organization of the banking industry may have played an important role in credit supply. In
fact, we also did find an increase in bank market power of the Spanish banks, in particular of
the bailed-out ones. Contrary to our expectations, the reduction of the degree of competition is
not found to be a determinant of the of the decrease in lending and liquidity creation after the
intervention of the Spanish regulatory authorities. Indeed, the results presented in this sub-
section are consistent with previous research predicting that regulatory interventions –including
capital support– do not necessarily improve neither credit supply nor liquidity creation (e.g.
Berger et al., 2016; Buston, 2015). Overall, the results presented in this study are also aligned
with previous research on industrial organization which advocates that reductions in bank
competition may diminish credit supply, creating possible financial restrictions in some cases
(see Sapienza, 2002; Ryan et al., 2014; Carbo´ et al., 2017).
5.4 Robustness tests: The Boone indicator
The specifications presented in Table 7 and Table 9 suggest that the resultant bank market
power after the implementation of the restructuring process increased financial stability, al-
though the results on liquidity creation and lending supply are inconclusive.
To test the robustness of the results presented above, we estimate in Table 11 and Table 12
five alternative specifications replacing Lernerit by the Boone (2008) concentration index (Bt).
The Boone’s indicator is based on the notion that efficient firms -i.e. firms with lower marginal
costs- gain profits and market shares. In other words, competition enhances performance of
efficient firms and weakens performance of the inefficient ones. The assumption behind the
Boone indicator is that bank’s products are substitute, and entry costs are low, thus increasing
competition in the market (efficiency structure hypothesis). Therefore, ‘efficient banks’ will take
a dominant position in the market with respect to their competitors, and they will increase
their profit due to the reduction in marginal cost is faster than increases in prices (see Bolt and
Humphrey, 2015; Tabak et al., 2012). Our results are similar to those obtained using the Lerner
index. The construction of the (Boone, 2008) concentration index is explained in Appendix
A.3.
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5.5 Discussion of the results
This study is aimed at disentangling the channels through which the restructuring process
affected financial stability, and liquidity and lending supply. The restructuring of the Spanish
banking sector was performed through two parallel ‘processes’: capital injections –or bail-outs–
and the integration of the weak financial institutions, thus leading to a reduction in the number
of competitors.
We benchmark our results with previous research to test the validity of our methodology
(see Berger et al., 2016). Regarding government interventions, our results are in line with previ-
ous literature predicting that bail-outs may induce banks’ risk-taking behaviour, thus reducing
financial stability (see Bianchi, 2016; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Flannery, 1998; Hryckiewicz,
2014). Precisely, Table 1 describes that banks’ risk patterns are changing. As for the begin-
ning of the crisis, the distribution of credit to the private sector was mostly concentrated in
Construction and Real Estate. Afterwards, the banking industry has been moving risks from
the above-mentioned sectors to Financial Intermediation –which is a risky sector–, whereas the
other sectors did not experienced significant changes.
Besides, summary statistics suggest that the Spanish banking sector experienced a reduction
in competition after selectively integrating weak financial institutions. The research question
now is which is the resultant force. In other words, what has been the sacrifice in terms of
competition for financial stability and lending supply?
According to the literature on Industrial Organization, merging firms, i.e. reducing the
number of competitors, may have a twofold effect depending on whether the restructuring
process creates more efficient firms, i.e. reducing marginal costs. Let us suppose an industry
in which regulatory authorities take banks over without considering improvements in newely
banks’ cost function, i.e. cost structure does not change with respect to the past. In this
case, the reduced number of competitors may well collude to increase prices, as predicted
by the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis. On the contrary, resolution authorities may
merge financial institutions with the intention of creating economies of scale amongst banks,
thus reducing marginal costs: the resulting banks will become more efficient than in the past.
According to the efficiency structure hypothesis, efficient banks may gain more market share
because they will be able to increase their business volume more quickly than prices.
The results of this study suggest that Spanish banks’ marginal costs has significantly re-
duced after the reform. Spanish banks reduced operating expenses –the number of employees
reduced by 26.52 percent from 2010 to 2016, and the number of branches also diminished by
33.23 percent from 2010 to 2016–, and financial expenses (-71.95 percent from 2010 to 2016)
during the restructuring process, according to the Bank of Spain’s database. Additionally, we
do not find empirical evidence of collusive behaviour amongst banks since prices are progress-
ively decreasing, and the estimates of the Boone (2008) indicator are negative for the whole
quarters (βt < 0). Our results instead suggest that the reduction in the degree of competition
is due to gains in efficiency which frames our study within the efficiency structure hypothesis.
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Furthermore, we also do find that the Spanish resolution authorities minded the gap in mar-
ginal costs between weak and healthy banks. As a result, the Spanish banking industry become
more homogeneous and stable due to the selective integration of banks. In this regard, the
regression estimates corroborate that the reduction in competition enhanced financial stability
in Spain in line with the competition-fragility-view (see IJtsma et al., 2017; Schliephake, 2016).
In line with previous research (Bassett et al., 2017), our findings suggest that banks parti-
cipating in the restructuring process did not improved lending supply compared to banks that
did not. This result might be driven by two factors. Firstly, the Spanish private sector is
performing a deleveraging process which reduced the demand for credit until the end of 2016
(BdE, 2017). Finally, the supply analysis do not report evidence that neither liquidity creation
nor the volumen of credit approached the monopoly optimal quantity. However, it is fair to
say that loan portfolio composition reveals significant changes of risk orientation, shifting from
Construction and Real Estate to Financial intermediation from 2007 onwards (Table 1).
To sum up, the findings of this study are relevant for economic literature because it demon-
strates that the success of a restructuring process depends on whether the resolution authorities
help newly created banks to decrease marginal costs in order to enhance the efficiency of the
overall industry, and tailor tailor a more homogeneous costs (i.e. less efficient banks converge
to the best ones).
6 Conclusions
This article analyses the effectiveness of the bail-out and the integration policy implemented
in Spain between 2010 and 2014 as a consequence of the financial crisis. To this purpose, we
combine data from Bureau van Dijk Bankscope, Orbis Bank Focus, and the Bank of Spain’s
Table of Public Financial Assistance.
The results of this study draw the conclusion that the bail-out, along with the integration
process undertaken as a part of the Memorandum of Understanding (see Section 3), improved
the stability of the overall Spanish banking industry. The Spanish resolution authorities simul-
taneously invited to weak banks to be integrated amongst them in form of IPSs, and in other
cases, healthy banks took other weak banks over, leading to an increase in concentration of the
banking industry (see BdE, 2017). Thus, the question to be addressed is whether it has been
translated into higher levels of market power and, if so, to search evidence of repercussions for
credit and liquidity supply as predicted by previous research. We do find that the restructuring
process indeed leads to an increase in the Lerner index for the Spanish banks, and this effect
has been also responsible of the improvement in financial stability by increasing profits, cap-
italization, and reducing differences in profitability amongst banks. However, we do not find
clear evidence for liquidity creation and lending availability.
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Appendix A
A.1 The Spanish bank restructuring process in 2006, 2010, and 2016
December 2006 December 2010 December 2016
La Caixa La Caixa Caixabank
Caixa Girona (Merge) (Merge)
Cajasol+ Cajasol
Caja Guadalajara+ (Merge)
Caja Navarra+ Banca C´ıvica
Caja de Burgos+ (IPS)
Caja Canarias+
Banco de Valencia (2012)+
Caja Inmaculada de Arago´n Banco Caja 3 (2011) Ibercaja Banco
Caja C´ırculo de Burgos (IPS) (Merge)
Caja de Badajoz
Ibercaja Ibercaja Banco
Caixa Galicia+ Novacaixagalicia Abanca
Caixa Nova+ (Merge)
Cajasur+ Cajasur Banco Kutxabank
BBK (IPS)
Kutxa
Vital Kutxa
Caja Castilla-La Mancha+ Cajastur Liberbank
Cajastur (IPS)
Caja Extremadura+
Caja Cantabria+
Caja Murcia+ Banco Mare Nostrum
Caixa Penede`s+ (IPS)
Caja Granada+
Sa Nostra+
Unicaja Unicaja Unicaja Banco
Caja Jae´n
Caja Espan˜a+ Caja Espan˜a-Duero
Caja Duero+
Caja Madrid+ Bankia Banco Financiero y de Ahorros
Bancaja+ (IPS)
La Caja de Canarias+
Caixa Laietana+
Caja de A´vila+
Caja Segovia+
Caja Rioja+
Caja de Ahorros del Mediterra´neo+ Banco CAM Banco Sabadell
(Integration)
Caixa Sabadell+ Unnim BBVA
Caixa Terrassa+ (Merge) (Integration)
Caixa Manlleu+
Caixa Catalunya+ Catalunya Caixa / Banc (2011)
Caixa Tarragona+
Caixa Manresa+
Caixa Ontinyent
Colonya Caixa Pollenc¸a
Notes: Own elaboration based on the Table of Public Financial Assistance, Bank of Spain. The + symbol
denotes the financial institutions taken into consideration as weak banks (Wi = 1) in our analysis. The second
and the third columns list the resulting banks in December 2010 and December 2014. The acronym IPS refers
to Institutional Protection Scheme.
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A.2 Calculating the marginal costs
The computation of the marginal costs (MCit) shown in expression 2 is based on the following
transcendental logarithmic cost function (see Birchwood et al., 2017; Carbo´ et al., 2017):
ln(Cit) = δ0 + δ1ln(TAit) +
δ2
2
(ln(TAit))
2 +
3∑
h=1
βhln(whit)
+
1
2
3∑
h=1
3∑
k=1
βhkln(whit)× ln(wkit) + 1
2
3∑
h=1
γhln(TAit)× ln(whit)
+ µ1Trend+ µ2
1
2
Trend2 + µ3Trend× ln(TAit)
+
3∑
h=1
λhTrend× ln(whit) + ln(uit)
(7)
where Cit represents the total costs (including operating and financial costs), and wit the
cost of inputs (labour, capital, and deposits). The variable Trend is included to control for
technological changes over time. A system of factor (share) equations is derived according to
the Shephard’s lemma:
∂ln(Cit)
∂ln(whit)
= mhit = βh +
3∑
h=1
βkln(wkit) +
γh
2
ln(TAit) + λhTrend (8)
where mhit represents the cost share of factor h for bank i in period t.
A.3 Calculating the Boone (2008) concentration index
The estimation of the Boone (2008) concentration index –indicator– is based on the following
equation, where we interact the Boone indicator with time dummies (Dt) to assess the time
evolution of competition:
ln(MSilt) = α +
∑
t=2002Q2−2016Q4
βtDtln(MCilt) +Dt + eilt (9)
where MSilt represents the market share for loans, and MCilt the marginal costs of the loan
market (l) for bank i at time t. The estimation of the Boone (2008) indicator for each period
t is the result of this regression. The interpretation of the parameter β proceeds as follows.
Banks with lower marginal costs are expected to gain market shares, then a more negative beta
indicates higher competition levels. Contrarily, positive values of β indicates that the market
has elevate levels of collusion. We create the variable Bt as a vector of the estimates of βt.
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Table 5: Means of the key variables depending on quartiles of Lernerit (2002Q1 - 2016Q4)
This table displays the summary statistics of the dependent variables employed in this study by quartiles of the
Lerner index. The regression coefficients represent the mean value of the variable, whilst the standard errors
are represented in parentheses. All specifications are estimated using OLS. The whole variables are defined in
Table 2. The F-statistics are shown to test the differences in the dependent variables amongst the quartiles of
Lernerit, and the p-value is represented in brackets. Estimates followed by *, **, *** are statistically significant
at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile F-test
ROAit 0.004
∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 39.29
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) [0.000]
CARit 0.057
∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 1,470.00
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) [0.000]
σ(ROAit) 0.019
∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 712.83
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) [0.000]
Ln(Zit) 1.128
∗∗∗ 1.391∗∗∗ 1.405∗∗∗ 1.496∗∗∗ 1,459.82
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) [0.000]
NPLit 0.071
∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 1,014.30
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) [0.000]
LCit/TAit 0.211
∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 788.45
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) [0.000]
LOANTAit 0.690
∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 4,016.68
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) [0.000]
RWAit/TAit 0.614
∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗ 3,801.35
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) [0.000]
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Table 6: Translog cost function coefficient estimates.
This table provides the SUR estimation of the translog cost function. Cost shares are the predicted costs spent
on each input. The dependent variable is the logarithm of bank’s total assets. The whole variables are defined
in Table 2. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the bank level. Estimates followed by *, **, *** are
statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Coefficient Standard error
Intercept -4.4241∗∗∗ 0.7467
Ln(TAit) 1.2832
∗∗∗ 0.0549
Ln(TAit)
2 -0.0044∗∗∗ 0.0003
Ln(w1it) 1.1414
∗∗∗ 0.2124
Ln(w2it) 0.6650
∗∗∗ 0.1803
Ln(w3it) 1.881
∗∗∗ 0.1151
Ln(w1it)
2 0.1552∗∗∗ 0.0032
Ln(w2it)
2 0.1469∗∗∗ 0.0064
Ln(w3it)
2 0.0187∗∗∗ 0.0025
Ln(w1it)× Ln(w2it) 0.1033∗∗∗ 0.0024
Ln(w1it)× Ln(w3it) 0.4324∗∗∗ 0.0201
Ln(w2it)× Ln(w3it) 0.0188∗∗∗ 0.0025
Ln(w1it)× Ln(TAit) 0.0430∗∗ 0.0174
Ln(w2it)× Ln(TAit) 0.0099∗∗ 0.0014
Ln(w2it)× Ln(TAit) 0.1441∗∗∗ 0.0075
Trend 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0000
Trend2 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000
Trend× Ln(TAit) 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000
Trend× Ln(w1it) -0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0000
Trend× Ln(w2it) 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0000
Trend× Ln(w3it) 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001
N 3,350
R2 0.9965
F-overall test 0.0000
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Table 7: The effects of bank restructuring process on financial stability.
This table provides the regression results of the effects of restructuring process on financial stability. Quarterly
observations for Spanish banks are applied from 2002Q1 to 2016Q4 in the whole specifications. The dependent
variables are the logarithm of the Z-score (Ln(Zit)) and the non-performing loans ratio (NPLit). Wi is a
dummy variable which takes the value one if the bank i has been bailed out in period t, and zero otherwise.
The variable dt is a dummy variable which takes the value one from 2011Q1 onwards, and zero otherwise. The
interaction variable Wi × dt represents the effect of the restructuring process. The whole control variables are
defined in Table 2. Columns (1) and (3) display the baseline regression, columns (2) and (5) include control
variables, and columns (3) and (6) contain interactions of Wi with the control variables. Standard errors are in
parentheses clustered at the bank level. Estimates followed by *, **, *** are statistically significant at the 10,
5 and 1% level, respectively.
Ln(Zit) NPLit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 1.482*** 1.524 2.032** 0.017*** 0.875*** 0.924***
(0.061) (0.968) (0.981) (0.004) (0.045) (0.044)
Wi -0.170** -0.170* -0.081 0.005* 0.015*** 0.019***
(0.075) (0.099) (0.138) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
dt -0.168*** -0.053* -0.072** 0.042*** 0.013*** 0.010***
(0.022) (0.036) (0.037) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Wi × dt -0.083* -0.072* -0.195*** 0.003 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.044) (0.027) (0.068) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ln(Ht−1) 0.380*** 0.460*** -0.108*** -0.117***
(0.130) (0.132) (0.006) (0.006)
Lernerit−1 0.043*** 0.041*** -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
MAit−1 0.208*** 0.388*** -0.020*** -0.056***
(0.053) (0.095) (0.003) (0.005)
INCit−1 0.454*** 0.225** -0.002 -0.011*
(0.106) (0.115) (0.005) (0.006)
EFFit−1 -0.036* -0.068*** 0.009*** 0.006***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.001) (0.001)
LOANTAit−1 0.270* 0.309** -0.073*** -0.052***
(0.145) (0.146) (0.008) (0.008)
NPLit−1 0.137 0.937**
(0.393) (0.426)
Ln(Ht−1)×Wi 0.066 -0.027***
(0.073) (0.003)
Lernerit−1 ×Wi 0.030* -0.002***
(0.018) (0.001)
MAit−1 ×Wi 0.313*** -0.052***
(0.116) (0.006)
INCit−1 ×Wi 0.917*** -0.085***
(0.305) (0.014)
EFFit−1 ×Wi -0.167*** 0.008***
(0.051) (0.002)
LOANTAit−1 ×Wi 1.435** -0.227***
(0.620) (0.025)
NPLit−1 ×Wi -5.884***
(1.202)
Crisist -0.014 -0.067* -0.065* 0.010*** 0.023*** 0.024***
(0.027) (0.035) (0.035) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 3,350 3,350 3,350 3,350 3,350 3,350
R2 0.139 0.101 0.132 0.422 0.581 0.617
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 8: The effects of bank restructuring process on ROA, CAR and σ(ROA).
This table provides the regression results of the effects of restructuring process on the components of the Z-score
(Zit). Quarterly observations for Spanish banks are applied from 2002Q1 to 2016Q4 in the whole specifications.
The dependent variables are return on assets (ROAit), the capitalization ratio (CARit) and the three-period
rolling window for ROA (σ(ROAit)). Wi is a dummy variable which takes the value one if the bank i has been
bailed out in period t, and zero otherwise. The variable dt is a dummy variable which takes the value one from
2011Q1 onwards, and zero otherwise. The interaction variable Wi× dt represents the effect of the restructuring
process. The whole control variables are defined in Table 2. Columns (1), (4) and (7) display the baseline
regression, columns (2), (5) and (8) include control variables, and columns (3), (6) and (9) contain interactions
of Wi with the control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses clustered at the bank level. Estimates
followed by *, **, *** are statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
ROAit CARit σ(ROAit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Intercept 0.005*** 0.036* 0.024 0.072*** 0.137*** 0.126*** 0.027*** 0.138*** 0.135***
(0.001) (0.018) (0.019) (0.003) (0.028) (0.027) (0.000) (0.014) (0.014)
Wi -0.003** -0.002 -0.001 -0.008*** -0.006** -0.002 -0.005*** -0.001* -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
dt -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.002*** -0.001* -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Wi × dt -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.000 -0.004** -0.003 0.005*** 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(Ht−1) -0.004* -0.003 -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Lernerit−1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MAit−1 0.002** 0.000 0.008*** 0.038*** 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
INCit−1 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.009*** -0.001 -0.004*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
EFFit−1 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
LOANTAit−1 -0.008*** -0.007*** 0.011** 0.030*** 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
NPLit−1 -0.071*** -0.054*** -0.033*** -0.009 -0.006* -0.008*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005)
Ln(Ht−1)×Wi 0.002* 0.006*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Lernerit−1 ×Wi 0.000 0.002*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MAit−1 ×Wi 0.002 0.037*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
INCit−1 ×Wi 0.001 0.034*** 0.003
(0.006) (0.008) (0.003)
EFFit−1 ×Wi 0.001 0.003** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LOANTAit−1 ×Wi -0.022** -0.097*** -0.001
(0.010) (0.016) (0.005)
NPLit−1 ×Wi -0.095*** -0.014 0.008
(0.018) (0.028) (0.008)
Crisist -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001* -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.011*** -0.001** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
N 3113 2488 2488 3350 2537 2537 5040 2536 2536
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 3,350 3,350 3,350 3,350 3,350 3,350 3,350 3,350 3,350
R2 0.079 0.286 0.285 0.145 0.119 0.191 0.236 0.152 0.138
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 9: The effects of bank restructuring process on liquidity creation and lending supply.
This table provides the regression results of the effects of restructuring process on liquidity creation and lending
supply. Quarterly observations for Spanish banks are applied from 2002Q1 to 2016Q4 in the whole specifications.
The dependent variables are the liquidity creation to total assets ratio (LCit/TAit) and the loans to total assets
ratio (LOANTAit). Wi is a dummy variable which takes the value one if the bank i has been bailed out in period
t, and zero otherwise. The variable dt is a dummy variable which takes the value one from 2011Q1 onwards,
and zero otherwise. The interaction variable Wi × dt represents the effect of the restructuring process. The
whole control variables are defined in Table 2. Columns (1), and (4) display the baseline regression, columns (2)
and (5) include control variables, and columns (3) and (6) contain interactions of Wi with the control variables.
Standard errors are in parentheses clustered at the bank level. Estimates followed by *, **, *** are statistically
significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
LCit/TAit LOANTAit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.369*** 0.741*** 0.572** 0.651*** 0.704*** 0.720***
(0.021) (0.238) (0.242) (0.021) (0.125) (0.124)
Wi 0.011 0.039* 0.030 0.019** 0.007 0.006
(0.018) (0.023) (0.026) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
dt -0.062*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.048*** -0.018*** -0.011**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Wi × dt -0.028** -0.005 -0.037** -0.021*** -0.035*** -0.015*
(0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Ln(Ht−1) 0.092*** 0.064* 0.189*** 0.189***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.016) (0.016)
Lernerit−1 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MAit−1 0.049*** 0.089*** -0.029*** -0.093***
(0.013) (0.025) (0.007) (0.013)
INCit−1 0.033 0.040 -0.178*** -0.165***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.013) (0.014)
EFFit−1 -0.026*** -0.031*** -0.007** -0.008***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
LOANTAit−1 0.411*** 0.341***
(0.037) (0.039)
Ln(Zit−1) 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
NPLit−1 -0.156* -0.073 -0.595*** -0.507***
(0.099) (0.108) (0.051) (0.055)
Ln(Ht−1)×Wi 0.070*** 0.014**
(0.020) (0.007)
Lernerit−1 ×Wi 0.007 -0.003
(0.005) (0.002)
MAit−1 ×Wi 0.047 -0.070***
(0.030) (0.015)
INCit−1 ×Wi 0.102 -0.033
(0.082) (0.037)
EFFit−1 ×Wi -0.028** -0.007
(0.013) (0.007)
LOANTAit−1 ×Wi 0.682***
(0.164)
Ln(Zit−1)×Wi 0.037*** 0.008
(0.013) (0.006)
NPLit−1 ×Wi -0.020 -0.938***
(0.328) (0.134)
Crisist -0.032*** -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.025*** -0.012*** -0.014***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 3,350 3,350 3,350 3,350 3,350 3,350
R2 0.088 0.249 0.284 0.013 0.984 0.984
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 10: The effects of bank restructuring process on RWA.
This table provides the regression results of the effects of restructuring process on financial stability. Quarterly
observations for Spanish banks are applied from 2002Q1 to 2016Q4 in the whole specifications. The dependent
variables are the density ratio measured as risk-weighted assets to total assets (RWAit/TAit). Wi is a dummy
variable which takes the value one if the bank i has been bailed out in period t, and zero otherwise. The variable
dt is a dummy variable which takes the value one from 2011Q1 onwards, and zero otherwise. The interaction
variable Wi × dt represents the effect of the restructuring process. The whole control variables are defined in
Table 2. Column displays the baseline regression, column (2) includes control variables, and column (3) contains
interactions of Wi with the control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses clustered at the bank level.
Estimates followed by *, **, *** are statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
RWAit/TAit
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.651*** 0.169 0.140
(0.017) (0.162) (0.161)
Wi -0.009 -0.015 -0.007
(0.014) (0.016) (0.018)
dt -0.086*** -0.025*** -0.018***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Wi × dt -0.026*** -0.034*** -0.006*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.001)
Ln(Ht−1) -0.068*** -0.017
(0.022) (0.022)
Lernerit−1 -0.005*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001)
MAit−1 -0.001 -0.002
(0.008) (0.015)
INCit−1 -0.029 -0.025
(0.020) (0.021)
EFFit−1 0.001 0.007*
(0.004) (0.004)
LOANTAit−1 0.380*** 0.451***
(0.026) (0.027)
Ln(Zit−1) 0.028*** 0.038***
(0.003) (0.004)
NPLit−1 -0.472*** -0.737***
(0.067) (0.071)
Ln(Ht−1)×Wi 0.020
(0.013)
Lernerit−1 ×Wi -0.012***
(0.003)
MAit−1 ×Wi -0.040**
(0.018)
INCit−1 ×Wi 0.048
(0.059)
EFFit−1 ×Wi -0.012
(0.009)
LOANTAit−1 ×Wi -0.118
(0.108)
Ln(Zit−1)×Wi 0.032***
(0.008)
NPLit−1 ×Wi -1.373***
(0.219)
Crisist 0.008 0.032*** 0.029***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES
N 3,350 3,350 3,350
R2 0.104 0.449 0.493
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 11: Robustness tests: The Boone’s (2008) concentration index and financial stability
indicators.
This table provides the regression results of the effects of restructuring process on financial stability. Quarterly
observations for Spanish banks are applied from 2002Q1 to 2016Q4 in the whole specifications. The dependent
variables are the logarithm of the Z-score (Ln(Zit)), the non-performing loans ratio (NPLit) and the risk-
weighted assets ratio (RWAit/TAit). Wi is a dummy variable which takes the value one if the bank i has been
bailed out, and zero otherwise. The variable dt is a dummy variable which takes the value one from 2011Q1
onwards, and zero otherwise. The interaction variable Wi×dt represents the effect of the restructuring process.
The whole control variables are defined in Table 2. Columns (1), (3) and (5) display the regression including
control variables, and columns (2), (4) and (6) contain interactions of Wi with the control variables. Standard
errors are in parentheses clustered at the bank level. Estimates followed by *, **, *** are statistically significant
at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Ln(Zit) NPLit RWAit/TAit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 2.661*** 2.933*** 0.835*** 0.875*** 0.090 0.141
(0.898) (0.902) (0.043) (0.042) (0.149) (0.148)
Wi -0.221** -0.076 0.015*** 0.020*** -0.014 -0.005
(0.095) (0.137) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.018)
dt -0.080** -0.034 0.011*** 0.009*** -0.019*** -0.012*
(0.037) (0.037) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Wi × dt -0.024 -0.265*** 0.014*** 0.013*** -0.032*** -0.011
(0.055) (0.074) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.012)
Ln(Ht−1) 0.514*** 0.561*** -0.101*** -0.110*** -0.060*** -0.022
(0.121) (0.122) (0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.020)
Bt−1 0.892*** 0.425*** -0.019* -0.012* -0.010** -0.021*
(0.253) (0.265) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011)
MAit−1 0.150*** 0.336*** -0.021*** -0.058*** -0.004 -0.011
(0.052) (0.094) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.014)
INCit−1 0.514*** 0.267** -0.000 -0.010* -0.017 -0.005
(0.104) (0.112) (0.005) (0.006) (0.019) (0.020)
EFFit−1 -0.023 -0.053** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.002 0.002
(0.019) (0.021) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
LOANTAit−1 0.134 0.191 -0.074*** -0.054*** 0.388*** 0.456***
(0.140) (0.144) (0.007) (0.008) (0.026) (0.027)
Ln(Zit−1) 0.024*** 0.030***
(0.003) (0.004)
NPLit−1 0.228 0.936** -0.504*** -0.722***
(0.377) (0.436) (0.063) (0.067)
Ln(Ht−1)×Wi 0.063 -0.026*** 0.013
(0.072) (0.003) (0.013)
Bt−1 ×Wi 0.416*** -0.075* -0.029**
(0.138) (0.039) (0.014)
MAit−1 ×Wi 0.343*** -0.055*** -0.028**
(0.114) (0.006) (0.013)
INCit−1 ×Wi 0.994*** -0.092*** 0.087
(0.291) (0.014) (0.057)
EFFit−1 ×Wi -0.157*** 0.009*** -0.007
(0.050) (0.002) (0.009)
LOANTAit−1 ×Wi 0.926 -0.206*** -0.131
(0.612) (0.024) (0.109)
Ln(Zit−1)×Wi 0.023***
(0.008)
NPLit−1 ×Wi -3.896*** -1.343***
(1.219) (0.220)
Crisist -0.010** -0.008** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.024***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 3,350 3,350 3,350 3,350 3,350 3,350
R2 0.183 0.147 0.293 0.383 0.444 0.499
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 12: Robustness tests: The Boone’s (2008) concentration index, and liquidity creation
and lending supply.
This table provides the regression results of the effects of restructuring process on liquidity creation and lending
supply. Quarterly observations for Spanish banks are applied from 2002Q1 to 2016Q4 in the whole specifications.
The dependent variables are the liquidity creation to total assets ratio (LCit/TAit) and the loans to total assets
ratio (LOANTAit). Wi is a dummy variable which takes the value one if the bank i has been bailed out in
period t, and zero otherwise. The variable dt is a dummy variable which takes the value one from 2011Q1
onwards, and zero otherwise. The interaction variable Wi×dt represents the effect of the restructuring process.
The whole control variables are defined in Table 2. Columns (1) and (3) display the regression including control
variables, and columns (2) and (4) contain interactions of Wi with the control variables. Standard errors are in
parentheses clustered at the bank level. Estimates followed by *, **, *** are statistically significant at the 10,
5 and 1% level, respectively.
LCit/TAit LOANTAit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.823*** 0.707*** 0.542*** 0.578***
(0.221) (0.224) (0.117) (0.116)
Wi 0.011 0.003 0.006 0.008
(0.021) (0.025) (0.012) (0.013)
dt -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.015*** -0.010**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Wi × dt -0.006** -0.028* -0.029*** -0.008**
(0.003) (0.019) (0.007) (0.003)
Ln(Ht−1) 0.105*** 0.085*** 0.170*** 0.173***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.015) (0.015)
Bt−1 0.201*** 0.200*** -0.006*** -0.010**
(0.063) (0.066) (0.001) (0.003)
MAit−1 0.055*** 0.095*** -0.022*** -0.079***
(0.013) (0.023) (0.007) (0.012)
INCit−1 0.036 0.040 -0.179*** -0.166***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.013) (0.014)
EFFit−1 -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.009*** -0.011***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
LOANTAit−1 0.407*** 0.342***
(0.036) (0.037)
Ln(Zit−1) 0.019*** 0.027*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
NPLit−1 -0.252*** -0.201** -0.611*** -0.516***
(0.094) (0.102) (0.049) (0.052)
Ln(Ht−1)×Wi 0.076*** 0.011*
(0.019) (0.005)
Bt−1 ×Wi 0.038 -0.162
(0.195) (0.100)
MAit−1 ×Wi 0.050* -0.060***
(0.028) (0.015)
INCit−1 ×Wi 0.164** -0.022
(0.078) (0.035)
EFFit−1 ×Wi -0.032** -0.011*
(0.013) (0.007)
LOANTAit−1 ×Wi 0.713***
(0.159)
Ln(Zit−1)×Wi 0.041*** 0.000
(0.012) (0.006)
NPLit−1 ×Wi -0.247 -0.955***
(0.323) (0.131)
Crisist -0.017** -0.020** -0.011*** -0.012***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Bank fixed effects YES YES YES YES
N 3,350 3,350 3,350 3,350
R2 0.253 0.288 0.332 0.362
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 
